CHAPTER 1. ELECTIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO REACTION.
As the recent Session of the Central Committee, celebrating the victorious 10th
ANNIVERSARY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR, concluded, Peruvian reaction and its master, Imperialism,
mainly Yankee imperialism, needs to reinvigorate bureaucratic capitalism, once again
restructure the old State, and annihilate the People's War. Those are their needs and
their dreams because bureaucratic capitalism is experiencing its most profound economic
crisis up to now, sinking the whole of Peruvian society into its deepest crisis ever. Its
state, the obsolete dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and landowners, restructured in
1978 for the third time this century, is still a rotten military- bureaucratic machine,
more oppressive and bloody, the more impotent it becomes with the development of the
People's War. Because the People's War, over these ten victorious years, mainly supported
by the masses of poor peasants and under the leadership of the Party, has achieved the
really thrilling prospect of conquering power throughout the country for the proletariat
and the people. Reaction and the imperialists design new plans and actions, which
inevitably will give more momentum to the class struggle, developing the struggle of the
masses and raising the People's War to its highest expression.
The above is happening at a time when the superpowers and the powers, all of them
imperialist or social-imperialist, in collusion and contention, stir up the contradictions
on a global level (oppressed nations versus superpowers and imperialist powers;
superpowers versus themselves and other imperialist powers; and the bourgeoisie versus the
proletariat; of the three, the first is the principal contradiction); thus developing
collusion and contention for areas of domination and a new partition of the world, which
entails new defined wars, regional and worldwide in perspective, despite all the sweet
talk about pacifism aimed at once more stupefying the world. Within these circumstances,
from the middle of the last decade, a new counterrevolutionary revisionist offensive is
developing led mainly by Gorbachov and Teng Xiao-ping (Deng). This offensive has
intensified lately, and is acting colluded with the imperialist offensive against Marxism,
loudly voiced again the presumed and widely publicized "obsolescence of
Marxism." Thus, the collusion and contention of both imperialism and revisionism, and
in this case mainly the collusion, are clearly seen in their sinister attacks against
Marxism-Leninism- Maoism. Under international conditions in which revolutionary struggles,
and increasingly the People's War acquires greater transcendence in the oppressed nations,
they become the base of the world proletarian revolution as the main tendency in world
history. This is a complex reality materialized in facts as it is happening in the
country, like Eastern Europe with its contention between the decomposition of revisionism
and the scramble for imperialist spoils, or Nicaragua whose incomplete democratic
revolution has wrecked in the waters of black prospects, or the dialogue of M-19 in
Colombia, with such instructive results, to name just a few.
Finally, there is the so-called "legitimization" as a political objective of
the counterinsurgency war, in its form known as "low intensity warfare," which
seeks governments produced by elections as a mean of providing them with
"legitimacy" and "authority," which should be recognized as such by
the people. In addition, according to them, they would "serve to satisfy the needs of
the people." In that way, elections are but a tool of the counterrevolutionary war.
All this makes the 1990 general elections vital to the interests of Peruvian reaction
and imperialism, mainly Yankee imperialism.
CHAPTER 2. THE POLITICAL CRISIS
INCREASES. THE CONTRADICTIONS DEEPEN.
In, "Against Constitutionalist Illusions and for the State of a New
Democracy," the Party said:
"ON THE ELECTIONS. Marx pointed out: 'Every few years the oppressed are authorized
to decide which members of the oppressor class will represent and crush them in
parliament!' And that is even more true when the elections are to approve constitutions.
Thus, elections are merely the method to renew the government administration of the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies, and this happens even in the most
democratic government we could imagine, and they are the usual means to preserve and
develop capitalism.
In the landowning-bureaucratic States of Latin America, when elections have fulfilled
their function of a changing of the guard, and at times during which the electoral norms
of the bourgeois-democratic system are respected, election is just a tool of domination by
the semi-feudal landowners and big capitalists, whether the renewal is done at
standardized periods as lately in Colombia, or to end a period of military rule as also
lately happened in Argentina, these are few examples of many in which our America is so
prolific.
"The above can be demonstrated for this country. Although with important
interruptions to the periodic electoral processes by military rulers -interruptions linked
on the one hand to the development of the People's War and, on the other, to the
contradictions between the landowners and the big bourgeoisie, and between the comprador
bourgeoisie and the democratic bourgeoisie. Highlighting that the military governments
themselves have been instrumental in implementing elections, be it to legalize its own
situation, or to end its rule, or to guarantee them- elections in Peru have helped to
preserve or develop the character of Peruvian State, the formal republic, the dictatorship
of the semi-feudal landowners and the big bourgeoisie. Thus, elections have been, as
couldn't be otherwise within the established social order, a tool first in the hands of
the comprador bourgeoisie and then in the hands of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This has
been the main characteristic in the electoral processes of the Peruvian State during this
century, which has determined the class character of elections in this country.
"These fundamental matters establish the following:
- 1. The Peruvian State is landowning-bureaucratic, a dictatorship of a feudal landowners
and big bourgeoisie, under ultimate control by Yankee imperialism; against whom the people
struggle for the construction of a State of new democracy, which requires the destruction
of the existing old order.
- 2. The Peruvian State, like every State, sustains, defends and develops itself by the
use of violence, in the face of which the people need revolutionary violence, following
the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside.
- 3. The elections are means of domination by the landowners and big bourgeoisie.
For the people they are neither instruments of transformation nor a means to overthrow
the power of the current rulers. Therefore, the correct orientation is using them only as
a means of agitation and propaganda."
That was said in 1978 and it is still valid. Let's point out that the elections of 1980
and 1985 proved it with facts. Thus, within this function of elections in Peru, similar to
that of other countries, and being as they are crucial to reaction, the 1990 general
elections showed and developed themselves in defense of the obsolete existing order and
evolution of Peruvian society. It was in this context that parties like APRA, IS
(Socialist Left), IU (United Left), FREDEMO and CAMBIO 90 sustained and defended very
similar objectives and goals which only differ in form and means of utilization.
The mobilization of troops for the elections amounted to 300,000 members of the police
and armed forces, the largest ever for an election, as the State itself has recognized. In
addition, they added tension and put into motion all State institutions; they unleashed an
all-out campaign aimed not just at capitalizing votes but to pressure the people into
voting and fighting against the People's War; all of that besides the most vile and low
demagoguery. Let's highlight clearly how the open intervention by the Catholic Church in
Peruvian politics is increasing by the day, as shown in these elections; but at the same
time we must see with concern the role of the evangelicals in these elections, and behind
which is the invisible hand of Yankee imperialism. Thus, while the armed force is still
the big elector and warrantor, the so-called "spiritual power" of the Church
rises more and more as political power. These elections show more clearly than others held
previously in the country that "everything is valid in order to win elections,"
and how reactionaries, in their own intestine fights, are capable of snatching from the
rest of the pack the best parts in the interests of their own groups or factions. So, what
would they not do in their struggle against the people and the revolution? The current
general elections have set on their way two additional reactionary offspring: racism and
religious struggle. The first is a nefarious fly-by-night ideology of purported
superiority, which are totally opposed to the forging of a nationality in formation like
ours, and the second, the religious struggle, is a sinister utilization of religion not
just as an instrument in the class struggle, which it really is, but to pit masses against
masses, derail the people's struggle and fetter the advancing revolution, the People's
War. But not only have those foul elements been put into motion; the reaction and the
classes, factions and groups that compose it, maneuver perversely with the threat of a
coup d'etat, its useful instrument, while cynically declaiming themselves in favor of
bourgeois democracy. All that, in addition to well- known machinations, tricks, chicanery
and fraud at the vote counting, take place along with repression and genocide in the
countryside. In that manner the electoral process smells of the dense foul odors of
fascism.
Based on the review of data from the "Total compilation of the April 14 general
elections," by the National Board of Elections and of the "National Consolidated
Presidential Results" published by the same body (JNE) on May 11, 1985, the results
are shown below as well as others in which we will refer to later on:
GENERAL RESULTS
| Registered Voters |
9,983,400 |
| Not Voting |
2,116,600 |
| Voting |
7,866,800 |
The table shows that those not voting are 21.2 % of the registered and 27% of those
voting.
VOTING PERCENTAGES
| FREDEMO |
27.6 |
| CAMBIO 90 (Fujimori) |
24.6 |
| APRA |
19.1 |
| IU (United Left) |
6.9 |
| IS (Socialist Left) |
4.0 |
| Others |
2.2 |
| Null and Blank |
15.3 |
The very low vote obtained by the first two candidates stands out. Neither one of them,
Vargas Llosa or Fujimori, reached even 30% of the votes cast; very far, then, from the 50%
plus one votes their constitution demands to assume the presidency. It was also very
clear, and we will return to it later on, that absenteeism, simply staying away from the
polls, has increased noticeably, reaching 21.2% of the registered and 27% of the voters;
that is, the highest vote getter only obtained 0.6% more than absenteeism. There you see
the self-proclaimed triumph of the so-called "democracy" and their purported
defeat of the so-called "terrorism!"
The 19% APRA vote implied the bankruptcy of their "traditional third," which
they bragged about for decades; however, their parliamentary contingent allowed them to
continue fulfilling their nefarious role in Peruvian history.
On another side, the self-proclaimed "United Left" and "Socialist
Left" were crushed by the same electoral process they worship so much; together, the
two of them didn't even match the number of null and blank votes. This, their unrestrained
parliamentary cretinism has suffered its most humiliating and catastrophic defeat: the
just punishment to revisionists, opportunists and traitors to the class and the people.
In synthesis, last April's general elections were earmarked by vote dispersal and
indefiniteness; the runoff election showed itself up as a still more murky, ambiguous and
demagogic contest of gambling political hacks. But, besides that, with the distribution of
seats, in parliament will develop a worsening collusion and contention between the various
groups and factions of exploiters, causing the decrepit parliamentary system to rot even
more. All of this shows how the Peruvian State has further weakened at its base, and will
have to be sustained once more by the armed and repressive forces, showing more clearly to
the people how the armed forces are the backbone of the State, and how this State is
merely based on an organized violence for perpetuating the slavery of the people of Peru.
The electoral process highlights fundamental problems in Peruvian society, despite the
pretensions of covering them up: First, the subsistence of semi-feudalism, basis of the
agricultural production crisis, bringing back to the forefront the land problem which
supposedly had been overcome. Second, the existence of bureaucratic capitalism, which is
sustained in economic underdevelopment tied to imperialist domination; imperialism, mainly
Yankee, as always sucking us dry of our blood and getting ready to suck us drier yet. In
synthesis, it shows the generalized crisis of an obsolete society having only one
solution: revolution, the victory of the ongoing People's War. On the other hand, the
disastrous result obtained by the APRA government headed by the genocidal demagogue Garcia
Perez, is evident. In 1985, we said that the new government would provoke more hunger and
would be still more genocidal; today hunger eats away and devours the class and the
people; and while according to data from the so-called "Pacification Commission"
of the Senate, the Belaunde government bloodied the country with 5,880 dead, the current
one surpassed it with 8,504 dead from 1985 to 88, and with another 3,198 dead in 1989.
Both of our 1985 predictions were correct, and in fact the APRA government of Garcia Perez
created more hunger and more genocide than any previous one in Peruvian history The people
will never forget him! All of which is sharpened and accented even more by the uncertainty
of the first round of the election and the postponement of the resolution until the
runoff.
The political parties were strongly shaken by the results of last April's elections and
were forced out of necessity to enter all sorts of realignments and regrouping, not just
for the sake of the runoff but, mainly, for their later development. While in the
electoral campaign they upheld "non partisanship," to lure the vote of the
independents, candidates trafficked with the lack of prestige of their own political
parties and the repudiation of the revisionist parties of Eastern Europe, aiming in
essence and perspective, against the party of the proletariat, against the Party,
preaching the putrid thesis of "no need for political parties." On this, let's
remember what Lenin said:
"Non partisanship is a bourgeois idea. Partisanship is a socialist idea."
(Read communist.) All that merely shows is the crisis of the parties which sustain the old
order; not a new crisis, but now sharpened by the electoral process and its disastrous
results; a crisis of the parties which obviously reflects the deterioration of the old
Peruvian State.
The first go around left two candidates. One, tired and in bad shape, Vargas Llosa, of
FREDEMO, the arrogant preacher of the upstart personal success, individual freedom and the
market economy, triumphant after having obtained first place with a meager 27% of the
vote. The other, catapulted and infatuated, Fujimori of CAMBIO 90, the treacherous and
sneaky carrier of the vaunted "Honesty, Work and Technology," the dark horse of
imperialism and reaction who obtained a second place with 24% of the vote. Both represent
the big bourgeoisie and imperialism. In the case of Fredemo the matter is clear. However
in the case of Cambio 90 confusion arises because of the class origins of their
candidates, from the petty-bourgeoisie and medium bourgeoisie, and by hiding their
pragmatic points, especially before the first run. But what have Fujimori himself, and his
advisors now preparing his government program, promised: a market economy, not even a
"social market economy"; to recognize the foreign debt and find ways to pay it;
to strengthen the banking system; to promote exports and even big mining interests; to
promote foreign investments and so-called international "assistance." Those are
all positions of the great bourgeoisie, and especially of one of its factions, the
comprador bourgeoisie, which will benefit the most. In addition, most of his advisors were
formed by imperialism and are linked to big bourgeois institutions, opportunists who had
participated in the APRA government, in IU, or coming from the Velasco regime. Of notice
are the links with Hernando de Soto, a character with strong links to Yankee imperialism,
directly endorsed by Reagan and Bush and a researcher of the so-called "informal
production" with which all now pretend to traffic, even Vargas Llosa and Fujimori
themselves.
So both Fredemo and Cambio 90 represent politically the big bourgeoisie. Already the
recent Central Committee session pointed out: "Cambio 9O, that movement led by the
former rector of the Agrarian University (Fujimori) has the same positions but not the
weight of Fredemo . . . " The assessment of its class character is correct, however
its definitive weight depends on the runoff election, given the importance of the
Presidential elections. The heart of the matter is, while both are focused on the
interests of the comprador bourgeoisie, Vargas Llosa presents himself as a defender of the
exclusive interests of that faction, while Fujimori presents himself as a defender of the
interests of the entire big bourgeoisie, but in addition, demagogically, he also claims to
defend the interests of the medium bourgeoisie and the people. Although they try to deny
it, that is the class character of the positions of both candidates, who lead Fredemo and
Cambio 90 like "caciques" . Vargas Llosa desperately tries to overcome that
limitation by appealing to all the people and promoting projects such us his so-called
"social support program," while Fujimori assembles and reassembles his plans and
keeps knocking on doors in search of connections and equipment for his possible future
government.
In these circumstances the runoff election is prepared, in which APRA, IU and IS and
their groups and factions play up to the highest bidder, leaning more and more toward
Fujimori, and APRA looking for important posts in the new government. It already presented
its detailed "conditions" to support Cambio 90, with phrasemongering to justify
their "principles," while the poor orphan "Socialist Left" (IS) begs
for crumbs off the big boys' table.
With all that, the basis on how the next government will look like, are being set.
Whoever wins, it will govern in the midst of contradictions, with collusion and contention
in the heart reaction and its lackeys.
CHAPTER 3. THE BOYCOTT DEVELOPS THE PEOPLE'S TENDENCY AGAINST THE
ELECTIONS AND SERVES THE PEOPLE'S WAR.
Once more the "defeat of terrorism" is preached to the four corners of the
world: from the genocidal demagogue Garcia Perez, to the various self-proclaimed and well
paid "senderologists"; and from the political parties of reaction and their
flunkies, to the bloody police forces; from the muddled and desperate presidential
candidates, to well-maintained hacks of all sorts; in unison, as should be expected, all
shout at the top of their lungs the purported and worn out '' defeat of Sendero," so
they, in defense of Peruvian reaction and especially of the big bourgeoisie, of
social-imperialism and of imperialism, mainly Yankee can create counterrevolutionary
public opinion for the benefit of the Old State and the armed forces' counterinsurgency
plans. Once more their cruel black dream of forever crushing the people and annihilating
the People's War sets in motion the fraud of the "defeat of Sendero, "which will
materialize, they claim without proof, as ghosts labeled "strategic failure," or
"the first and foremost loser," and "split and surrender" of Sendero.
As their notorious wishful thinking prays, the Peoples' War "got into the swamp"
in 1989, the elections would show the great defeat of the boycott, and the Party would
split, and the fighters of the People's Army of Liberation would surrender.
Let's begin with the so-called "strategic failure" due to "Sendero's
falling into a swamp in 1989." Nothing better than starting from the Report on
"Great Fulfillment of the Pilot Plan!", presented to the Central committee in
June of last year, one of whose parts we transcribe below:
I. GUERRILLA ACTIONS.
PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS DURING NINE YEARS OF PEOPLE'S WAR.
"The process of forging and development of nine years of People's War contains
four milestones:
- 1. Definition,
- 2. Preparation,
- 3. Beginning and,
- 4. Development;
The People's War, strictly, speaking has developed as a process of qualitative leaps by
means of four plans up to now. Each plan is a more higher and comprehensive than the
previous plan expressing thus how the People's War has been getting more complex.
1. THE BEGINNING PLAN, fulfilled by way of two sub plans, spans less than a
year: a) from May to July of 1980, 280 actions were completed. That was the beginning;
and, b) from July to December of 1980, driving forward the People's War, fulfilling 1,062
actions. We already notice a leap, a growth, and the time also was longer: in total 1,342
actions.
2. THE DEPLOYMENT PLAN was broader yet, the plans spanning longer periods and
consisting of more campaigns. Deployment had a previous plan: Opening up guerrilla zones,
and developing platoons and detachments leading to Bases of support. Since the objective
was to unfold the war fanning throughout the country, three campaigns were conceived:
- a. Conquering weapons and resources,
- b. Shaking up the countryside with guerrilla actions,
- c. Scouting for the advance toward Bases of support, this last was applied in two
stages. It spanned two years and carried out 5,350 actions.
While the earlier plan initiated the armed struggle, this new phase generated the New
Power. By the end of this plan, the armed forces entered directly to fight us (December of
82). This plan was more complex: several campaigns began to be managed as part of the same
plan, each campaign marked by the definition of political strategy and military strategy.
3. PLAN OF CONQUERING BASES, from May 1983 to September of 86. First two
campaigns were unfolded: Defend, Develop and Construct precisely in 1983-84, which was the
most difficult moment; the armed forces were stopped short by those campaigns. This third
plan developed a Campaign of great importance with a sub plan, The Great Leap, which meant
largely overcoming the problems, and expanding the theater of military and political
operations from Cajamarca to Puno, centered in the mountains but also spanning the Jungle
and the Coast. By then, too, reaction thought they had annihilated us and swept away the
People's War.
The plan of Conquering Bases took three years, four months, and consisted of 28,621
actions; it provided support bases and the entire support system, guerrilla zones, zones
of operation and points of action.
4. GREAT PLAN OF DEVELOPING BASES (GPDB), with this we entered a very
transcendental process because the support bases are the core of the People's War, there
is no People's War without support bases; the Central Committee decided to apply the plan
first as a Pilot Plan, from December 1986 to May 89, 2 years eight months more or less,
with three campaigns, the third one in two parts; it consisted of 63,052 actions; it
showed its merits and exceeded the objectives, now we begin its definitive approval.
Thus, we have in nine years a total of 98,365 actions; counting the complementary
actions there were more than 100,000; mainly, the great final conclusion completed in
July, as a second special ending.
The plans are strategically centralized and tactically decentralized; they are
strategic plans that include actions and construction; they are developed through
campaigns. Later the plan begin to be more complex and of longer duration; later still sub
plans are developed, or limited plans developed within the general plans; and finally on
entering into the GPDB, we propose applying it as a pilot plan. Each plan has its
political and military strategy. They are tested and implemented in battle; the results
show the readjustments to be made, and above all the subsequent conditions for the success
of the subsequent plan. We concretize our judgement of the results in clear phrases that
allow us to wield them easily, for example: "The Great Completion of the Pilot
Plan!"
The Central Committee approves Strategic Operating plans; such as the 1979 Expanded
National Conference agreed upon, strategically centralized plans, which also takes into
consideration the operational situation and establish the four forms of struggle:
- 1. agitation and propaganda,
- 2. sabotage,
- 3. selective annihilation and,
- 4. guerrilla combat.
They determine the parts, establish periods and fix the chronology.
We must always pay close attention to strategic centralization, since that's what
determines our ability to within the plan and to develop the revolutionary waves
systematically and simultaneously hit diverse and broad areas with all possible forms and
means, to deliver hard and serious defeats to the enemy. Those who have studied the
principles and military theory of Chairman Mao always point out that he established a
strategically centralized plan, a key point that allows us to develop the actions:
Applying it has enabled us to deliver hard and simultaneous blows to the enemy in almost
the entire country, thus causing them more difficulties.
We must insist on strategically centralized plans, without forgetting they are
tactically decentralized. Apply Strategic Operating Plans because these establish the
nexus between strategy and tactics. Already comrade Stalin had suggested visualizing the
bond joining the strategic whole with the concrete actions.
Let's point out how we began "out of nothing," because that is how Chairman
Mao taught us. The main thing is to have a Party with a correct and just line, then the
problem is to begin. Since the problem is not how many we are but is rather, if we want to
initiate the armed struggle or not. With the People's War we have developed the Party,
built the People's Guerrilla Army (today the People's Army of Liberation) and molded the
New Power, and our mass work has experienced great quantitative and qualitative leaps; we
have been wresting the weapons away from the enemy and the transfer of modern weapons is
taking place more often.
The People's War has brought us to the Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan, which we
finished successfully and brilliantly! Thus, we have exceeded the accomplishment of the
Pilot Plan of the Great Plan to Develop Bases; from that derives the need to Drive Forward
the Support Bases. If we had not conceived it that way, it would not have the sense of
having been completed. It began as pilot plan because this great plan implied very
important qualitative changes. It was already proved in practice, its mandatory objective
was to proceed with, Drive Forward the Development of Support Bases! , within the new
GREAT PLAN OF DEVELOPING BASES TO SERVE THE CONQUEST OF POWER in the entire country.
In nine years we have developed, through these plans, the People's Army and the New
Power and we have applied and will insist that the Party leads the People's War and
absolutely leads the army, since we are guided by the Party commanding the gun and will
never allow the gun to be in command of the Party. We have also insisted that, as Chairman
Mao taught us, the war follows the politics; we will follow Lenin: War is the continuation
of politics by military means; it has been and will continue to be that way, therefrom
derives the class character of war. When Marxism is negated by others, we communists have
to reaffirm ourselves more in our principles. When we confront counterrevolutionary
campaigns like those worldwide against Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, like those in our country
against the Party and the People's War, those are the moments we must grasp our principles
more firmly and visualize the undeclinable objective toward which we are going: Communism.
Let's insist on this more today, when Gorbachev, Deng and their cronies spread that we can
no longer understand war with criteria from the past, that we can no longer say war is the
continuation of politics; that what Clausewitz set forth, to which Lenin agreed and
Chairman Mao developed, is not a principle that applies today according to Gorbachev, who
also cries out loud that war will take us to the disappearance of the human race, that war
will have neither winners nor losers because no one will survive it: sinister positions he
inherited from Khrushchev. We condemn, and mark with fire, those revisionist positions
against the People's War; we reaffirm ourselves that People's War is the continuation of
politics by the force of arms in the service of the proletariat and the people, of their
interests. If we were not firm in our principles and flexible in their application we'd
lose the direction of the people's war and crash down into revisionism. That's why we must
persist in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, in the people's war and in the
Communist Party leading it until Communism.
Furthermore, let's emphasize:
- 1. centralization;
- 2. more complex plan;
- 3. the new, Great Plan of Developing Bases to Serve the Conquest of Power in All the
Country! ; and,
- 4. persisting in the principles of People's War.
COMBAT ACTIONS AND ARMED STRIKE.
The Pilot Plan was successfully completed in three campaigns. The second part of the
third campaign, Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan! , Whose balance we areevaluating,
materialized an increment of 172% compared to the first part, a very noticeable increase
even if the second part lasted longer than the first. In nine years of People's War there
were 100,000 actions, this figure does not include complementary actions.
The total number of actions of the, Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan! Was 32,646 and
the third campaign, in its two parts, shows an immense jump relative to the second
campaign of the Pilot Plan, since it quadruples it despite lasting only three more months;
there we have one of the extraordinary results of the First Congress of the Party.
AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA.
It's one of the four forms of People's War and, consequently, it is erroneous to see it
as a separate thing; not to see it as a form of war leads us to make mistakes. The main
thing is to develop it as the most profound campaign of agitation and propaganda ever made
by any party in the country; that is, propaganda as the diffusion of ideas aiming toward
the objective, and agitation as the utilization of concrete problems, which the masses
struggle through. These actions, like the other forms, spread revolution, People's War,
politics, ideology; today they disseminate the need to conquer Power countrywide. Thus, we
go down to the lowest masses, who normally can neither read nor write; Engels taught us to
solidify with facts the ideas in the minds of men, as a matter of principle; it is the
material fact that generates knowledge; the four forms of war are material facts that
those who execute them, or experience them, militants, fighters and masses, go on enduring
the effect and the confirmation of the need for the war, for conquering political
objectives, for conquering Power; of the need for the ideology of the proletariat. Thus,
agitation and propaganda deepen among the masses of the country, stir the mind,
disseminate and go on confirming the need for revolution; they deal with the real source
of knowledge. Agitation and propaganda develop as psychological action and psychological
warfare.
Lenin said that propaganda is never lost, no matter how much time there is between the
sowing and the reaping, and if the action is done with weapons in hand, with armed actions
aimed at mobilizing the masses, that is the best school to forge the people in the
ideology of the proletariat, in the politics of the Party and in the need for the People's
War to conquer Power. Let's consider its great importance: it is linked to winning over
and to forming public opinion to the fact that the People's War goes on generating a
spirit of transformation among the masses, as Tulio C. Guerrero says. It has much
potential to disseminate the People's War, and is fundamental to generate public opinion,
to accentuate the People's War, the political objectives, the conquest of Power,
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, the ideology, the politics of the Party and the
policies on different levels, and we must keep in mind that we cannot conquer Power
without generating public opinion.
SABOTAGES
They continue to play an important role, hitting the Peruvian economy hard, which
develops itself in the worst conditions, in the deepest crisis in our history. Sabotaging
the mining sector that has transcendent importance because the largest percentage of
convertible currency comes from this activity; it hits the Peruvian State directly
because, besides creating problems for it, those are blows it receives in the economic
activity of the State, for instance Centromin It creates problems for the State itself, we
burden with debt their corporative plans, which are fouled up. Furthermore, their
"social measures," which they must always recur, are also hit and so the
counterrevolutionary armed action itself is weakened. The sabotage of the electrical
network is very important; the last few blackouts affected nine departments, from the
northern Department La Libertad to the southern Department of ICA and going through the
nation's capital, going inside the departments of Jun¡n, Pasco, Hu nuco, Ayacucho,
Huancavelica, the heart of their economic system, the very axis of their administrative
system, which is the capital. The blackouts are generating more problems for them each
time. The paper El Comercio published about the last blackout that electricity could only
be restored in Lima 10 days afterward. They have implied that they intend to utilize more
thermal generators, a greater expense because the cost to produce that type of energy is
very high. Besides hitting the public administration and their banking system data
processing, industry also experiences difficulties. They greatly impact on the masses
because whoever sees the blackout knows what its cause is, and the masses see how the
Peruvian State, expressing its class character, tends first to the needs of the big
bourgeoisie and postpones those of the people; that way, the masses are gradually forging
clearer judgement each time. The big bourgeoisie suffers with the sabotages, hence the
Society of Mines and Petroleum demand that armed forces and police reinforce the military
occupation in the mines.
The main thing is to let the effects of sabotage be felt in the most important, most
advanced economic zone, in the central economic zone which at the same time is the most
strategic zone to restructure the old Peruvian society, their old State.
SELECTIVE ANNIHILATION.
It is increasing and hitting hard the authorities. We reaffirm that this way the
functioning of the State apparatus is beheaded and paralyzed. Some, the reactionaries and
their cronies the opportunists, say "how is it possible to vilely murder mayors
elected by the people?" First, it must be explained that the election is only a
reactionary instrument of the bourgeois democratic system. We will never allow ourselves
to be deceived by the political stupidity of those who only speak of dictatorship if there
are no elections. United Left (IU) and their ilk may say such things; but a communist can
never think that way since the State, first and foremost, is a class dictatorship, and the
mayors, the governors, or the bureaucratic authorities, of the CORDES or similar
organizations, are part of that State system, of that violent reactionary structure.
Hitting or beheading State authorities or bureaucrats of whatever level hampers the
running of the State and even more generates a Power vacuum. One of the traditional
problems of the Peruvian State, as Mariategui already noted, is that it has never
been able to extend its power to the remotest corners of the country; it is a fact
that reaction is sited in central locations, in the cities, and has been extending its
power to intermediate size cities, and once in a while it reaches small cities; while the
annexes or towns in the countryside, villages or shantytowns are beyond the State and do
not endure steady control; it is a problem linked to the semi-feudal bases sustaining it.
So, then, the annihilations undermine the State order and that is good. It helps to erode
it, because the political vacuum created is left in our hands, to fill it and exert power.
Having five forms of Power we can set up any one of them. Remember that some say, "the
Vietnam example is good," but they forget 13,000 authorities were annihilated
there; thus, the annihilations made by the Vietnamese were good, but the ones we make are
bad? Why? What objectives did they accomplish and do we accomplish? To undermine order, a
problem clearly established by Cassinello in Guerrilla and Counter guerrilla Warfare
.
GUERRILLA COMBATS.
The quantity is high and its percentage begins to grow even more. The two fundamental
forms of combat actions are developing:
- 1) ambushes and
- 2. assaults.
Ambushes are developed, each time more stunningly and we are hitting the armed forces;
to hit their officers has much importance and we already see its results: petitions to
leave the army are growing so much that they had to prohibit them; desertions increase and
clashes among them are starting; the selling of weapons is increasing and will continue to
grow.
On this point reaction reaches the extremes of sarcasm, stupidity and ridicule by
decrying we are "cowardly ambushing them," "they don't fight face to
face." In what ambush does one show the face? The key to ambush is surprise. Ambush
is a norm to us, as it is to all armies, but we should not allow ourselves to be ambushed
nor counter ambushed. When we hit the military, they cry out, "Barbaric! ,"
"Brutal murder!"; so then, how do they say "we are at war" and what
role do their armed forces have other than to fight in a war? Mercado Jarrin says the
armed forces are the "insurance policy of the nation"; yes, they are the
insurance policy of reaction and its backbone; that is why we have to annihilate them
totally and completely.
Guerrilla combat, like annihilations, are lowering the morale of the armed forces,
which are drafted troops fighting against their will, with little instruction and kept in
check by ferocious reactionary iron discipline. Some say they would rather have a more
reduced professional army, better armed with sophisticated weapons and very well paid, but
that would not be beneficial to them, it would only allow us to increase our forces and
make more critical the disproportionate ratio between us and them; as is well known, the
norm is that when a guerrilla activity is well developed, reaction requires a ratio of up
to 20 to one, as shown by international experience; in our case, although we are not
highly developed, they need to increase their forces. In second place, can they do it? ,
No. They do not possess enough means to do it, officers themselves are badly paid and the
severe crisis the country is experiencing does not permit great investments like that,
consequently they need the "foreign aid" of the superpowers and/or imperialist
powers and to them they appeal more and more. The USSR just sold them helicopters from
Afghanistan at bargain prices. The USA gives them "military aid," training and
giving them resources, and their direct participation is obvious, such as the struggle
against "drug trafficking" in words and against the People's War in deeds. Keep
in mind what we have seen already about a possible Yankee aggression, considering
especially the U.S. actions in Huallaga; remember what we read in the military magazine of
the U.S. army about national strategy, it maintains that even not having a declared war,
they develop subversive wars, insurrections, terrorist actions, drug trafficking and that
those are areas in which the armed forces must participate and fight.
Thus, they are finding serious problems with the development of the guerrilla combat.
As regards quality, we are seeing a leap especially in the guerrilla combats; each time
the assaults are more important, an example is Uchiza , which even caused the enemy
internal contradictions between the armed forces and the government, and between the armed
forces and police forces; and successive ambushes show a better handling of them.
ARMED STRIKE.
It is a new modality in the struggle, which implies an entire combination of actions,
it has to manage the four forms of war: agitation and propaganda, sabotage, selective
annihilation and guerrilla combat; and at the same time it implies mobilizing an enormous
mass which helps the force of the New Power, the existence of the New State and the
questioning and negation of the old State. The armed strike, militarily speaking, manages
the four forms and impacts on huge numbers of masses leading to isolating vast areas and
demonstrating besides how easy it is to isolate the capital city (Lima). Since 1979 we
know that Lima is the most vulnerable capital in Latin America, keep that in mind to
continue hitting them, and for tomorrow, when we have Power in the whole country, we will
defend it from counterrevolution.
Confronted with armed strikes reaction will aim, as it does, to fetter them and prevent
them, to break them up; it will make false calls to strike or will use its weapons; for
instance in Chosica they called a false strike just to make a show of force, to pressure,
intimidate and lead the masses to reject the strike; but that will not be enough for them,
they will have to repress the armed strikes, answer them militarily, not merely as a show
of force, but to break the actual armed strikes with fire and blood.
Armed strikes are also making the revisionists nervous, the trade union bureaucracy,
all those who ride on the backs of the masses; these hacks will continue opposing the
armed strikes claiming these are "an authoritarian imposition," that "the
unions are not the ones calling them." Our answer is simple: it is not an industrial
or trade union action but a military action to keep on isolating, hitting, eroding and
undermining the old order so the people can see clearer each time the powerlessness, which
the Peruvian State is being reduced to. Therefore, we are not talking only about a
struggle for labor demands or just vindications, but rather we are developing a military
action to undermine the old order, show its impotency, create public opinion and impact
the broader masses; and that, in perspective, entails the sectionalizing of the country in
a more extensive way, which will involve another problem of the plan we put in motion: the
leap from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare.
Military work develops in the country and the city following the path of surrounding
the cities from the countryside, and our specific condition is that we also shake up the
cities, but the four forms of war develop mainly in the countryside, and as complement in
the cities. That scheme will continue to develop more, considering that the armed strike
happens above all in the cities; for example the armed strike in Central Peru involving
important cities like Huancayo, Jauja, Oroya, Huanuco, Cerro de Pasco; that is,
departmental and provincial capitals. Work in the countryside is good, extremely important
and principal, but advancing the work in the cities is a necessity that will increase and
we must focused on that type of work.
In synthesis, as regards quality and quantity we can say that qualitatively and
quantitatively the People's War is developing strongly and vigorously; we persist on the
road of surrounding the cities from the countryside; the countryside is principal and the
encirclements are already closing in more and more. Therefore, the People's War has made a
great quantitative and qualitative leap in this Pilot Plan and it germinates a more
transcendent advance.
PLAN OF STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT
Our investigation shows that everything remains firmly grounded within the main points
(the axis, sub axis, directions and mobile lines), they are well established and are being
managed even better. What derives from this is that at this moment we have no need to
change things; it would even be inconvenient to alter them at this time. Reaction enters
into strong difficulties and contradictions; the problem of the municipal and general
elections, the two electoral runs and the new administration take them to a collusion and
contention; but each collusion is sustained within the contention and can explode at any
time; these situations, of contention, of rupture, that can even lead to a coup d'etat at
least in the next two years that must lead us to advance boldly. For that reason it is not
convenient to vary our plans and we must strive to wield them better. Don't forget that
all of our Party's work is developed within the strategic development plan, provided that
the Party leads everything.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
It remains even clearer that we are developing within the Sierra region of the country.
Historically Peru has had a vertebrate axis: the center-south mountains, it was that way
at the times of the Incas; in the war with Chile it was the area defending itself better
and where forces can retreat before a foreign attack.
We also develop within the jungle strips, areas which are showing good fighting
conditions for the masses; most peasants there are linked to coca growing, the Upper
Huallaga is the largest producing area in Latin America, larger than those in Colombia and
Bolivia; for that reason as well it is important to reaction. We are also developing
within the Apurimac jungle strip and we must emphasize our penetration into the Central
region. The perspective is to cover all the jungle strips.
The theater is also being extended on the Coast. From the edges of the Coastal areas,
you can penetrate into the Sierra, for example the mid-North (Norte medio) and the Mid-
South.
This leads us to develop the other coastal zones, especially the work in the northern
and southern coast of our country. Also, to develop more the cities in the Sierra. It is
very important to focus the struggle in the cities, it has to do with the insurrection; if
we don't prepare for the seizure of the cities, mainly the largest ones, to complete the
final stage of the People's War, the conquest of power in the entire country will be
delayed. The work in Lima must be developed more, considering that it is the capital.
Also the theater enables us to develop incursions, which facilitate developing the
theater or retreating during enemy offensives.
In synthesis, the theater is showing its expansion and the interrelation between the
committees, also the capacity of incursion between the one and the others. Consequently,
the perspective of the theater is to vertebrate the entire People's War. With the
development of the war, we will have to redefine the committees, above all to conform to
the development of the EGP (People's Army.) Thus, the theater shows how it is expanding
and we see a process of vertebrate in which the encirclement of the cities is setting in,
not just the capital but the rest of the cities too.
This ends the partially transcribed report. But let us consider the following outline:
PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR
THIRD MILESTONE: BEGINNING OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR
I. INITIATION PLAN (MAY-DEC. 1980)
Initiate the Armed Struggle
Drive Forward Guerrilla Warfare |
1, 342 actions |
FOURTH MILESTONE: DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
II. DEPLOYMENT PLAN (JAN. 81- JAN 83)
Open Guerrilla Zones
First Campaign: Conquer Arms and Resources
Second Campaign: Rock the Countryside with Guerrilla Actions
Third Campaign: Stir 1 and 2 to Advance Toward the Support Bases
|
5, 350 actions |
III. PLAN TO CONQUER BASES (MAY 1983-SEP. 1986
Defend Develop and Construct I and II
Great Leap
First Campaign: Initiate Great Leap!
Second Campaign: Develop the Great Leap!
Third Campaign: Develop the People's War!
Fourth Campaign: Cap off the Great Leap! (First Part)
Cap off the Great Leap with a Golden Seal! (Second Part)
|
28, 621 actions |
IV. GREAT PLAN TO DEVELOP BASES. PILOT PLAN (DEC. 1986-MAY 1989)
First Campaign: Pilot Plan to Develop Bases
Second Campaign: To Brilliantly Fullfill it and Establish a Historical Miliestone!
Third Campaign: To consolidate and Develop the Great Completion! (First Part)
Great Completion of the Pilot Plan! (Second Part)
|
63, 052 actions |
V. GREAT PLAN TO DEVELOP BASES AND TO SERVE THE CONQUEST OF POWER (AUG. 89- )
First Campaign: To Drive Forward the Development of Support Bases
The partial implementation to the end of 1989. |
23, 090 actions |
| TOTAL NUMBER OF ACTIONS |
121, 455 |
NOTE: Up to this time four milestones have been specified in the development of the
People's War: FIRST: DEFINITION, whose center is the IX Plenum of the Central Committee,
June of 1979. SECOND: PREPARATION, centered in the Expanded National Conference, November
1979. Furthermore, this table does not include the actions carried out within the
complementaries.
This shows clearly the immense progress and great development of the People's War,
unless someone tried to sustain the absurd claim that the leap was quantitative, a change,
but not qualitative. It is seen clearly and convincingly how each subsequent plan implies
a higher leap than the previous one. If we compare plans III and IV, although plan III
took three years and four months, and plan IV only took two years and six months, the
number of actions in the latter plan more than doubles the former.
On the other hand, if we consider the application of the new GREAT PLAN TO DEVELOP
BASES IN SERVICE OF THE CONQUEST OF POWER just begun in August of 1989 with the First
Campaign of Driving Forward the Development of Support Bases, in its four months of
execution, until the end of last year, it materialized 23,090 guerrilla actions.
Consequently, considering that four months is half the duration of the Grand Completion of
the Pilot Plan! , The second part of the preceding plan, the new Great Plan has already
achieved the notable increase of 41.5 percent in its guerrilla actions; an increase whose
importance is better understood if we keep in mind the enormous increment that the
completion of the Pilot Plan implied. And if we compare results, the 23,090 guerrilla
actions involve 19.0 percent of the total actions up to December of 1989; 23.5% of the
actions in the nine years before this plan started and 36.6% of the actions in the entire
Pilot Plan. In about four months we achieved almost 37% of what we achieved previously in
thirty! There it is, the new Great Plan has begun resolutely and victoriously.
Finally, if we center on 1989, the year of the proclaimed and supposed
"swamping"; considering from October 88 to December 89, a period in which 32,644
actions were registered in the completion referred to above and 23,090 in the New Plan, we
have a total of 55,736 guerrilla actions; that is about 46% of all the actions completed.
There you have the great "defeat of Sendero!"
CONCRETE ACTIONS
With regards to concrete actions in this period, we emphasize the following:
Regional armed strike in Ayacucho, lasting one week, in February of 89; while rural
nucleations built by the armed forces were destroyed. Harvest [campaign] took place in
Huaycan, in the capital itself in the same month: 2,000 people were mobilized with the
support of the EGP (People's Army), who annihilated the manager and a foreman of the Fundo
under attack; the masses appropriated the produce by sharing it. Assault on the police
counterinsurgency base DOES-6 at Uchiza, March 27: the base was taken, the contingent of
48 military surrendered among them 15 wounded, three dead officers and seven police dead.
The taking of Pampa Cangallo: in April, the 600 soldiers were kept at bay and unable to
leave their barracks while the town remained under the control of the People's Army (EGP).
Also in April, mobilization of the Committee of Families of Prisoners of War and
Disappeared, in Lima, against the Ministry of Justice, with agitation and sabotage; it
kept in check the plans of repression against families, and lawyers and genocide against
the prisoners. The same month assaults to police posts in Yauricocha, Upper Lar n and
Clemente, in the Mid South.
Regional armed strike in Central Peru, departments of Jun¡n, Cerro de Pasco and
Huanuco. On May 10-12 an armed strike took place in Ca¤ete, southern part of the
Department of Lima, on June 1-2, and on the 7th, assault against the police station of
Ambar, northern part of the Department of Lima. Ambush of a presidential escort transport
car, "Jun¡n Hussars," in downtown Lima; 7 soldiers killed and 29 wounded in
June 3. In the same month, armed strikes: June 5-7 in Huancavelica; on the 7th in Huaraz;
and June 15-20 in Upper Huallaga. June 19, ambush of the army in Aguayt¡a, as part of
armed strike: a convoy of six trucks on F. Basadre highway; annihilated were an army major
(second chief at Ucayali political-military command), a lieutenant and 14 soldiers,
besides 10 wounded, total 26 casualties.
In the month of July, armed strikes: on the 14th in Huamachuco; on the 20th in Lima,
against hunger and repression, organized by MRDP [Revolutionary Movement in Defense of the
People]; and from July 27-29 in Ayacucho. On the 5th, sabotage of a bus of the Soviets who
pillage the country's marine life; 33 wounded; an ambush against a DOES police patrol in
Az ngaro, Department of Puno, annihilated a commander, a captain, a lieutenant and
three subordinates, on the 6th; assaulted the police station in Pacar n, Ca¤ete; the
station was destroyed, the bridge joining Pacaran, in Yauyos, and Huancayo was blown up.
The military barracks in Madre Mia was destroyed, 150 soldiers (120 infantry and 30
engineers), in the Upper Huallaga Valley; the assault took place on July 27, on the eve of
the "national anniversary": after a pitched battle the People's Guerrilla Army
destroyed the reactionary army barracks thoroughly and completely, causing them 64
casualties (39 dead and 25 wounded) and conquered a good quantity of military supplies.
Also in that area, a year ago the police station in Cotahuasi, Department of Arequipa,
was assaulted; and the police station at the Huancaray hydroelectric, in Apurimac. As
well, in the Department of Huancavelica mesnadas of Pachaclla were annihilated and
several towns were taken in the principal axis of the People's War in the region,
generating a Power vacuum. And, ambush to army in Milano, Upper Huallaga; assault to
police stations in Julcan, in Otuzco, Department of La Libertad, and in Cajacay,
Department of Ancash.
Now, if we focus on the People's War according to the regions or zones in which it is
developing we have the following scenario, centered on the First Campaign of the plan
Driving Forward [Impulsar], opening the new Grand Plan:
AYACUCHO: The Heroic Struggle
If we consider from Pampa Cangallo in the south of the department; in October a series
of actions against the armed forces and the micro region were carried out; the main one
was the attack and eventual collapse of the barracks in Vilcashuaman, sabotage of State
installations, propaganda, agitation and mobilization in the town, which was taken over by
the People's Army (EGP); as well, the harassment and collapse hit the anti-guerrilla bases
in Pampa Cangallo, Cangallo, Puente Matero, Accomarca, Ocros, Cayara, Hualla, Canaria,
Huancapi and Chipao. Because of the large impact on the masses, especially those who under
pressure of the military joined the mesnadas, and who have stopped patrolling and standing
guard. The army reacted desperately and imposed a curfew, repressing, arresting, shaving
heads.
Municipal elections in November were confronted by the new armed strike from the 5th to
the 15th, which has proven to be a big weapon to hinder, boycott and impede elections
wherever feasible. There were no candidates in Concepcion, Carhuanca, Huambalpa, Andamarca
and Cabana; in Huancapi, Mualla, Colca and Cayara nobody knew who the candidates were; in
Vilcashuaman all resigned except for a member of United Left while in a showcase of
"bourgeois democracy," in Carhuanca and Huambalpa, on the same day as the
elections, SIN members captured two peasants at the town square, told them, "You are
the candidates! ," and beat them up until they accepted their "candidacy."
That is how their "democracy" and their "elections" truly are, the
people are witnesses! However their objective failed because most of the population did
not vote.
An action related to the elections is the stunning ambush on an army convoy on the
13th, in Andamarca, where 10 soldiers and an official of the electoral jury were
annihilated.
And, though partially, the Little March that mobilized hundreds of people armed with
various means and carrying red flags with the hammer and sickle, banners and posters about
the People's War, traveled through many towns and villages like a little machine sowing
the People's War, developing actions and profoundly moving the masses. On the other hand,
hard crushing blows are delivered to the recalcitrant black heads who lead the
"mesnadas" controlled by the armed forces, as in Huamanquiquia and Sacsamarca,
province of Huancasancos. At the same time that the People's War extends to the main part
of the Coast by the taking of towns like Ocana and the destruction of the police station,
close to the highway to Nazca.
Consider the northern part of the Department of Ayacucho, the provinces of Huamanga,
Ruanta and La Mar. The municipal elections obviously carried great importance. In the city
of Huanta, the provincial capital, there were no candidates, since all of them quit; in
Ayacucho, departmental capital, the candidates quit too, but when the APRA candidate quit
(a former Bela£nde man who was unknown in Ayacucho and was not even there on election
day) his resignation was not accepted by APRA; when the resignation of the United Left
(IU) candidate, violating electoral norms, was withdrawn with the opposition of the rest
of his ticket, he persisted in resigning, disowning his candidacy. Applying the boycott,
as in other parts, the Party carried out the armed strike on November 11-13, throughout
the area; from the 10th, transport was paralyzed by blocking and opening ditches across
highways; through radio broadcasts, the masses were even asking for the electoral process
to be halted. The armed forces, the police-military command, answered them by applying a
6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew; on the day following the attack of the 9th, the
simultaneous capture of Ayacucho and Huanta by the People's Army (EGP); the armed forces
decreed "a suspension of public activities until the 13th"; making large
roundups and threatening arrest and other draconian sanctions to anyone who did not vote,
according to the provisions repeatedly broadcasted through the radio.
On the 12th Ayacucho woke up amidst great explosions and under a huge deployment of
military and police forces. The genocidal demagogue Garcia Perez came the same day to
stage "the triumph of democracy in Ayacucho"; he proffered orders and counter
orders as he saw fit, as he does daily; he conducted a rally of Apristas (APRA members),
mesnadas (paramilitary peasants) and soldiers dressed in civilian clothes in which very
loudly, histrionically and egotistically he announced his personal "victory" and
the "defeat of Sendero," the "triumphant and exemplary electoral
process" and the "boycott failure." But elections were not held in Huanta
nor did Ayacucho elect a mayor, since the "leftism" chosen by some vanished
amidst the over two-thirds of blank and null votes, of the small minority who voted at
all; that too was the "victory" which United Left celebrated euphorically,
loudly shouting "we won at Ayacucho!".
At the end of the counting, even the JNE hacks had to declare the results invalid. In
addition, like in 1985, in some places the masses were forced to vote by soldiers and
police kicking and hitting them, such as in San Jose; or their electoral books were simply
stamped, then soldiers filled in the ballots for them, such as in Pischa and Acocro; while
in Llochegua and Churcampa voting simply was done at the military barracks. In Julcamarca
the People's Army (EGP) captured the town and after keeping the antiguerrila base at bay
burned the municipal council (consejo municipal) and prevented the elections; in Acocro it
forced them to be stopped, and the same in Pacaysasa, where soldiers abandoned protection
of the tables leaving their lieutenant alone. In synthesis, the boycott was a brilliant
political triumph; absenteeism was massive and even the minority who voted, voted mostly
in blank or null ballots.
But notwithstanding the importance of the boycott, part of the People's War, a basic
question in its development can be seen in the great advancement of work in cities such as
Ayacucho and Huanta; the taking of both, by siege, on November 9, applying containment to
prevent the police and armed forces from massively leaving their quarters, and forcing the
foreign mercenaries to keep away and hide like rats in their nests at the airport, is
clear proof of this advance. Also, the incursion into People's Cooperation in Ayacucho,
against the Aprista candidate, annihilating his police escort, in October; and the attack
on the technical police departmental headquarters annihilating a lieutenant and a corporal
and wounding two others, in the same month; or the car bombs, one at the office of the
director of education, and the other thirty meters away from the main square (Plaza de
Armas), respectively in October and December. However, the main and more transcendent
development of the People's War is still in the countryside: the destruction of the
mesnadas in five towns and finishing off fifty of their most recalcitrant members; the
demolition of the nucleations in Vicus and Huayllay and the annihilation of their black
heads, and nucleations organized and sustained by the armed forces against the will of the
masses, especially of the poorest peasantry; the ambush against mesnadas in Pichihuilca or
to an army truck in Palmapampa, barely three hundred meters from their anti-guerrilla
base, in November and December respectively, and repeated hits to the marine infantry,
show this in all clarity.
APURIMAC: Area of Intense Confrontation
The Department of APURIMAC too, is an area of hard and intense confrontation. Proof are
the sabotages and leveling to the ground of installations, and Town councils, micro
regions, "cooperation popular," Entel Peru, Ministry of Agriculture, the
electoral registry, Sierra Centro-Sur, military registry, National Bank and TV stations;
or the selective annihilations of snitches, infiltrators, cattle rustlers, promoters of
the mesnadas and spies; or the assaults, ambushes and multiple confrontations registered.
All that, together with hundreds of agitations and mobilizations and dozens of seizure of
towns. There the State acts with harsher repression and the police and armed forces become
increasingly more bloodthirsty and virulent; one sample of this are the genocidal forays
by the army, in this area and in others; one of the most recent, in April, departed from
Antabamba province, Department of Apurimac, going all the way to Cusco, plundering,
burning and murdering in the peasant communities it overran; it was denounced, in vain as
usual, before Congress. But responding to the slaughter, guerrilla actions rose up
vigorously, Pushing Forward the People's War in those areas; such as the assault to the
Vilcabamba police station, province of Grau, on May 14, 1989, executing in combat a
policeman, a lieutenant, wounding several more, and generating a blackout in seven
districts; that is the truth and not the deceit (fairy tales) printed by the reactionary
press about "15 terrorists were killed in the surroundings of Cotabambas." Or
the ambush to the army in Caraybamba, on 5 October 1989, annihilating three soldiers, and
one lieutenant and wounding seven soldiers.
Close to that area we have the actions in Caraveli province, Department of Arequipa;
and the taking of Caraveli, on December 1, 1989, where two police stations, the military
registry, the Bank of the Nation, the electric power plant, a TV antenna and the quarters
of the Ministry of Agriculture were sabotaged and destroyed; the old authorities ran away
and took refuge in the port of Atico. Also the taking of Pausa, capital of the province of
P ucar del Sara-Sara, Department of Ayacucho, on December 2; the masses were
mobilized, flags were raised and revolutionary slogans painted; besides the sabotage and
burning of the council, police station, electoral registry and quarters of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Entel and Center-South Sierra; this stunning blow also helped destroy
electoral materials and by doing so elections were crippled in the entire province. And,
of course, the just policy of "escape" applied in the Caraveli jail in December,
which was easily overrun by the People's Army.
HUANCAVELICA: Place of Devastating Ambushes
Also has to its credit devastating ambushes, on October 23 the combatants handed
another blow to the army in Lanchoj; a land mine blew up two trucks in a convoy of three,
and after a demolishing attack; and later a violent combat with eight soldiers, who
commanded by a lieutenant, remained some distance from the third truck; of those three
were annihilated in combat; this convoy was heavily armed since it carried chiefs to their
anti-guerrilla bases; as usual, newspapers minimized the facts: "four officers and
nine soldiers were annihilated." when in fact we annihilated 36. Add to this action
the clashes at Santa Ines and Chupamarca and the harassment at Castrovirreyna, totaling 11
dead. So the reactionary Peruvian army suffered 47 dead, among them 10 officers, not
counting the wounded which, obviously, raises the number of casualties. Their furious
response, impotent for not being able to hit their ambushers, preys upon the unarmed
masses; at Santa Ana, on 25 October, they tortured peasants asking them about the
guerrillas and murdering five; in the same place, on the 28th, they burned the hut of a
peasant and murdered him for being an uncle of a revolutionary soldier; and in Lachoj, 70
soldiers stationed themselves on the road, on the 28th, stopping anyone coming through,
they robbed, tortured and raped women; and on the 31st they murdered four more in Pucara.
Here too, the electoral process has been deepened the class struggle; reaction has set up
its elections, maintaining them primarily on its armed forces; to that end they brought in
more soldiers from Huancayo and marine infantry from El Callao; from Huancavelica to
Ticrapo they deployed into the countryside campaigning for the elections and calling on
people to vote, threatening with the firing squad anyone not doing so.
Part of their control was to establish a permit (safe-conduct) system for traveling; 5
days before the elections they stopped the train leaving Huancavelica, arrested 400
passengers, whom they robbed, tortured and paraded through the city while they shouted the
same would happen to all those who don't obtain and produce a safe-conduct pass. In the
same city the soldiers waged war against revolutionary signs (paintings) with Party
slogans on the walls, taking down red flags, which they dragged through the streets,
shooting and reaping them, but contrary to their expectations, the people laughed and
ridiculed them. Then military proceeded to conduct illegal searches of homes and murdering
and disappearing noncombatant civilians (among them 13 students from the Pedagogic
Institute, the victims of repeated searches.) The masses were also black mailed, for
instance, as a condition to pick up their pay checks, teachers had to attend a boring
lecture by the political-military chief; at the same time flyers were dropped from
helicopters: "peasant friend, reject the terruco because he is your enemy" (any
similarity is not a simple coincidence!). But faced with this sinister campaign, the
People's War confronted it boldly and resolutely; as a sign of this advance in the
departmental capital itself on October 8, the army barracks, commissary and police
cafeteria were sabotaged; there was a blackout and, most important, agitation was begun at
the cinema, the masses went out into the streets and formed a steadily increasing chorus,
which turned into a roaring rally at the Main Square, shouting "vivas" to
Chairman Gonzalo, the Party, the People's War and urging, "Don't vote!", amidst
the darkness, dynamite explosions and rifle shots; neither soldiers nor police went out
and the People's Army (EGP) controlled the city. The 12th, election day, passed amidst the
strike and the daily blackouts from the 11th to the 13th of November; the dawn broke with
red flags with the hammer and sickle posted conspicuously on the streets and violent
explosions; it was a dead city until about 11:00 a.m., at which time soldiers began to
enter houses looking for leaders and members of electoral boards, and bringing the people
out to vote by force; but that resulted in less than 40% of the electorate in that city
voting; but in the barrios, young towns, and their surroundings they did not go to vote,
the strike besides, which the highways into the city were blockaded. If this happened in
the capital city, in the smaller cities and in the countryside the problem was worse for
reaction; since, besides not having any candidates in many places, not to vote was the
sentiment and desire among the masses, because from experience "voting" means
nothing for them. Here we have, too, a good example of how to use elections in a
revolutionarily manner.
THE CENTRAL REGION.
It is the heart of the economic process of Peruvian society, whose vertex is Lima and
it is key within the State's geopolitical plan, considering this reality, the action and
development of the People's War in this region is better understood. There the struggle
increases in intensity and shows sharper characteristics than in other locations;
sabotages there are tremendously stunning, like the leveling to ground in SAIS Tupac Amaru
and Ramon Castilla, or the Los Andes fish farm, or the offices and encampment of the
Pichis-Palcazu project; and among these, the of SAIS's Tupac Amaru horses used by the
army; and sabotage of the agricultural enterprise of Romero , a concoction of bureaucratic
capitalism and the big bourgeoisie, in Chanchamayo, where 10,000 sacks of coffee were
destroyed. Great sabotages against the State enterprises; at Enafer, blowing up of
locomotives or derailments like those in Yauli and Chuccis; attacks at Centromin,
sabotages in mines of Casapalca and Morococha, in the latter paralyzing the mineral
concentrator or in Oroya paralyzing the refinery and foundry, besides the derailments of
trains loaded with minerals; at Electroperu, the taking down of towers, 59 of them during
the November armed strike, thus generating large and extensive blackouts.
Also, blowing up of bridges: Four in Mucllo, Comas and Concepcion-Satipo highway.
Moreover, not just State mining is hit, also hit are two other "private" mining
centers like Allpamina, property of R. Gubbins, notorious member of the big bourgeoisie.
In addition, of great importance are the cattle (livestock) requisitions and invasions of
land, 8,200 sheep and 10,300 hectares, all for the masses, mainly for the poor peasantry.
That way the traditional economic base of Peruvian society is seriously hit and the basis
of the Old State deeply undermined in this region, as in others. It is in turn very
important how the People's War penetrates into the central jungle strips, developing in
the provinces of Tarma, Chanchamayo and Satipo; while at the same time empowering the
class struggle in Huancayo, the departmental Capital, whose undeniable examples are the
mobilizations by 5,000 high school students secondaries in July, and 15,000 students in
October; besides the selective annihilations of authorities and candidates, which shake up
the entire region (in August, in Tarma, the sub prefect was the only remaining civil
authority; while in Huancayo the sub prefect and lieutenant-mayor were annihilated; and in
Concepcion the provincial mayor); and to emphasize how the struggle is elevated, ambushes
against Centromin and Enafer train were carried out. As regards the municipal elections,
in order to activate them and control them they brought troops from Lima, Trujillo,
Iquitos and Tacna; they unleashed electoral blackmail, genocide and psychological warfare,
deploying thousands of soldiers and police from their repressive forces. There too, the
Party applied the armed strike from the 11th to the 13th throughout the region. It was a
remarkable success and the masses observed it, especially in Junin and Pasco. Through
force reaction tried to break the strike and force the people to vote, and to that end,
from the eve of the elections, above all in the marginal neighborhoods of the major
cities, they began to drive the masses like if they were cattle. But they failed in their
effort to obtain a large voter turnout since the absenteeism was massive; despite the
collaboration of revisionists, opportunists and reactionaries, the elections had to be
held only in the departmental and provincial capitals.
THE HUALLAGA VALLEY.
The Huallaga Region, and above all the Upper Huallaga is strategic, and each day of
greater importance; not only because of its huge potential in natural riches, whose
plundering by the World Bank, the International Development Bank and imperialist
enterprises in collusion with the great bourgeoisie and the Peruvian State have been
planned for years, but mainly because of the vigor with which the People's War develops
there. Its forcefulness and advances are clearly seen in the hard blows administered
against the reactionary armed forces, such as the destruction of the army barracks in
Madre Mia, added to the numerous ambushes which followed, among which these stand out:
against the army again, on the highway connecting Uchiza and Progreso, in the second part
of 1989, annihilating a lieutenant and seven soldiers, with four wounded and the surrender
of three; and against the police in Villa Palma, with the annihilation six police and two
wounded; both in September. And in October, the ambush against an army convoy with 35
troops, of whom one officer and four soldiers died, and leaving 12 wounded. Guerrilla
actions which, given the conditions of their development, considerably increase the
annihilations against authorities, snitches, infiltrators, spies and enemies of all kinds.
Around the elections, as in the entire country, these actions increased, especially
against municipal authorities and candidates, paralleling an intense campaign among the
masses calling on them not to vote; with all this, in spite of the bloody genocidal
electoral repression, it could not prevent a high degree of absenteeism. On the other
hand, it is of substantial importance for revolution and counterrevolution (or its risk)
the greater repercussion of the People's War each day in the areas bordering the north of
San Mart¡n, all of Huanuco and Ucayali; obviously this prospect, as that in the rest of
the country, increases the nightmares of reaction, disrupting still more their uneasy
sleep of a cornered beast. But the struggle there also justly hits the genocidal demagogue
himself, Garcia Perez, capturing and flattening the cattle ranches "Acuario" and
"Mi Sue¤o," of his property, located at Km. 35 on the Federico Basadre Highway,
and at Km. 7 on the highway to Nueva Requena; attacked on May 24 and June 5 of 1989,
respectively; distributing the confiscated goods and cattle among the masses (more than
700 persons participated), among these were 188 cattle and 50 calves, six horses, 15 pigs,
etc.; and destroying calamine, dozens of drums of petroleum and oil, 10 tractors, three
(large) electric generators, etc. Of course, that is nothing compared to the immense
crimes committed by this sinister individual; meanwhile, let us get one hair out of the
wolf; some day the people will do justice.
The situation in the Huallaga Region raises an important concern of a possible direct
intervention by Yankee imperialism. This matter revolves around the prospect that the
contradiction nation versus imperialism might become principal, which would represent a
basic change in the strategic and development of the People's War in Peru. A magazine of
the United States army states:
"Finally, and more seriously, the United States confronts one aspect of the
insurgency in Latin America which offers a greater threat, but one which perhaps could
still provide us with the weapon allowing us to recover the moral superiority, which we
apparently have lost.
"There is an alliance among some drug traffickers and some insurgents. Several
countries in Latin America confront the corruption of their rulers and military officers.
These countries make an effort to treat the problem with the uncertain support of the
United States and with varying degrees of success. The dollars earned by the drug
traffickers are delivered to the boxes of certain guerrillas or, possibly, in the form of
weapons and material, to the hands of the guerrilla.
"A solidification of this connection in the public perception and in Congress will
carry us to the necessary support to counter these guerrilla terrorists/drug traffickers
in this hemisphere. It would be relatively easy to generate such support once the
connection is proven and a total war is declared by the National Command Authority.
Congress would have difficulty preventing the support for our allies with the training,
advising and security assistance necessary for them to fulfill their mission. The
religious and academic groups who tirelessly have supported Latin American insurgents
would see themselves in an indefensible moral position.
"Above all, we would have an unblemished moral position from which to launch a
coordinated offensive effort, for which we would count the resources of the Department of
Defense and the rest of the sources. The recent operation in Bolivia is a first step.
Instead of answering defensively to each insurgency according to the individual case, we
could initiate actions in coordination with our allies. Instead of immersing ourselves in
the legislative mesh and the financial constraints characteristic of our position of
security assistance, we could answer the threat more swiftly. Instead of debating each
separate threat, we can begin to perceive the hemisphere as a unity, and at last arrive at
developing the vision that we so much need." (Military Review,
Spanish-American Edition, May 1987, pp. 49-51.)
Thus, "drug trafficking" is a "weapon to recover the moral
superiority" of Yankee imperialism, providing it with a "moral position for a
coordinated offensive" and with the "hemispheric vision," which it now
lacks. These criteria, obviously more developed than before, guide Yankee politics. We see
very clearly how sinister is the plan to slander the People's War as
"narco-terrorism" and whose interests it serves, and what the aim of the Old
State is, of reaction, of revisionism, of the opportunists and their lackeys of all kinds,
whose arch-reactionary campaigns for many years have slandered and charged the People's
War with "narco-terrorism." The objective of such slander is plainly and simply
to promote the aggression and intervention by Yankee imperialism, serving and defending
their interests, as well as those of Peruvian reaction. That is why we must expose even
further the counterrevolutionary essence of presenting the People's War as
"terrorism" or "narco-terrorism"; we must denounce the increasing
Yankee intervention and its plans of aggression. Let's develop and popularize our anti-
imperialist campaign of, "Yankees Go Home!". Let's aim better and make an effort
to unite the Peruvian people, the immense majority of them, on the basis of the
peasant-worker alliance; to prepare ourselves ideologically, politically and organically
to continue developing the People's War under any circumstances, raising even higher
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought; to go on fighting each day persistently and
relentlessly to conquer Power in all the country, as part of the world proletarian
revolution, to which we are linked stronger than ever in the overflowing cause of
Communism; and to hit our enemies accurately and stunningly, whoever they are, and even
more so Yankee imperialism, as we already did in the attack of Santa Lucia, its military
base of anti-national aggression, on April 7, one day before the general elections of
1990.
THE SOUTH.
In the South of the country the People's War develops mainly in the Department of Puno.
Among its noticeable actions we have the assault and taking of of Ananea, province
of Sand¡a; where we hit simultaneously the two police stations, and annihilated the
governor, the mayor, the judge and nine policemen, including one wounded and two who
surrendered. In Yunguyo, on the Bolivian border, sabotage destroyed the sub prefecture,
meeting nearby were Garcia Perez and the Bolivian president. This action generated, once
again, patrol incursions by the armed forces of the neighboring country; as in Ananea, it
was carried out in October. In November, while Azangaro was taken, peoples' trials and
anti-electoral propaganda were made, the candidates resigning en masse as in Huancane. In
December, Orurillo, province of Melgar, was taken and peoples' trials and selective
annihilations were applied. But actions were not restricted to Puno, also in the
departments of Cusco, Arequipa, Moquegua and Tacna, although these departments sabotage
and armed agitation and propaganda develops more.
THE NORTH
On its turn, in the North of the country, the city of Huamachuco, capital of the
province of Sanchez Carrion, was taken over in October, the mayor was annihilated. In
November, annihilation of the mayor of Sanagoran; as well as in Trujillo, capital of the
department of La Libertad, five sabotages shook the city, in the near vicinity the
ministers of foreign relations of the Group of Eight countries were meeting, the satellite
TV antenna was sabotaged, a simultaneous action was done against Channel 7 in Santiago de
Chuco and two radio stations run by revisionism in Cajabamba, Department of Cajamarca. And
in December, an attack on Cachicad'an and assault on the Mollebamba police station. The
actions developed too on the Northern Coast, besides Trujillo, Chimbote, Chiclayo, Piura
and Tumbes are, as cities (the three last ones are departmental capitals), theaters of the
People's War, developing in them not just propaganda and sabotage but selective
annihilations, against an army captain and two policemen, in Tumbes and Chiclayo
respectively.
Both in the North and in the South the "land problem" is fundamental, and
where the Party's policy is applied, developing (with arms in hands) the invasions and
distributing land, as well as defending them later on. The issue is to defend and conquer
the land with the People's War, and in a like manner to conquer and defend the necessary
conditions to develop production for the benefit of the people. Both in the South and
North as well as in the rest of the country, the campaign to boycott the municipal
elections were carried out successfully. Armed strikes were promoted to raise the
political conscience of the masses, and they were organized only in places where it was
possible to guarantee its success, such as in the provinces of Azangaro, in Puno, and in
Santiago de Chuco, Otuzco and Sanchez Carrion in the department of La Libertad. These
armed strikes paralyzed those regions and resulted in greater voter absenteeism and had
repercussions.
In the Mid North, part of the Department of Lima and Ancash, an attack against the
president of the electoral board in Huacho, and the annihilation of two policemen at
Barranca, both actions took place in September. A sabotage of a bank in Supe and the
blowing up of the municipality and police station in Carquin; destruction of micro region
in Bolognesi; in Cajatambo, attack on the police counterinsurgency base, peoples' trial to
the mayor and sabotage to the regional educational direction; on the Callejon de Huaylas,
for three days in a row, electric towers were blown up generating blackouts in 50 towns,
red flags with hammer and sickle were raised and anti-electoral slogans were painted; the
seizure of Trillos, in Bolognesi province, peoples' trial was held; all these guerrilla
actions took place in October. The government decreed a state of emergency in Barranca,
Huaura, Cajatambo and Oyon provinces in the Department of Lima; and sent an army battalion
to Huaraz. The day before municipal elections, the People's Army took over a bus 25 km
from Huaraz, the capital of the Department of Ancash, and after getting the passengers out
dynamited it (the companies suspended service); sabotage to the residence of the governor;
a general blackout in Aija, Recuay, Yungay, Carhuaz and Huaraz. In the Mid South, the
southern part of the Department of Lima and ICA, violent guerrilla hits in the mountain
province of Yauyos took place, bordering the departments of Junin and Huancavelica, the
People's Army seized several towns and wounding one policeman in a clash in Lincha, in
September; and in the same month the towers were blown up at Ca¤ete, while the newspapers
themselves cried out: "They have taken over the ICA countryside." In October,
taking over the city of Palpa, provincial capital; the precinct and the investigative
police post were smashed, annihilating a captain and six policemen. During the same month,
a 48 hours armed strike were carried out in the province of Nazca, it was a complete
success since the city streets were completely deserted. Also in October, the district of
Zu¤iga was taken over by the guerrillas, in the province of Ca¤ete, with more
annihilations; and topping off the month's actions, the Coyllor bridge was blown up. The
November campaign was focused on the boycott, with propaganda and agitation not to vote;
actions against government buildings in Nazca, in the districts of San Clemente and Tupac
Amaru of the province of Pisco, whose capital experienced a blackout; actions aimed
against the residences of the candidates; the Aprista meeting in ICA was interrupted, and
in Pisco it was canceled. In the Mid North, an intense campaign was developed for the
boycott and against the municipal elections, and an armed strike was organized in the
Callejon de Huaylas with multiple guerrilla actions. It was a complete success throughout
the Callejon, helping much to increase electoral absenteeism. Both the Mid North as well
as the Mid South are, strategically, of paramount importance to surround Lima, as everyone
knows.
LIMA.
The capital city, with one-third of the nation's population; macrocephalic capital of
an oppressed and backward nation, is a great concentration of economic, political and
military power, a gigantic mirror of the general crisis in Peruvian society; an immense
drum of national and international repercussion; but at the same time, mainly the primary
center of the Peruvian proletariat, prime witness of the hunger and struggles of
inexhaustible legions of popular masses, flesh of the flesh of our heroic people who
constantly toil, day after day, working and fighting at the factories and in the
neighborhoods and shantytowns.
Based on these outstanding characteristics, we can judge the fundamental and
transcendental importance of waging the People's War also in the capital; more so if the
road from the country to the city, of surrounding the cities from the countryside, must be
crowned, after the arduous struggle of the protracted war, in the insurrection in the
cities and mainly so in the capital city; especially if we keep in mind the peculiarities
of the People's War in Peru, which follows the road from the countryside to the city, but
develops the struggle in both, with the countryside the main part, as it still is, and the
city as a complement, as was set in the "Outline of the Armed Struggle" approved
in the VIII Plenum of the Central Committee. Starting from that premise, part of the
Party's propaganda reaches the capital to profoundly transform and shape its ideological
and political foundations; there the proletariat and the people receive the class
ideology, turning into the strength of their arms the messages they get in their minds:
the "Interview to Chairman Gonzalo"; the poster "Nine years of People's
War"; the graphic publication "Day of Heroism. Third Anniversary"; Chairman
Mao's "Nothing is impossible to whomever dares to climb the heights"; Lenin's
anthology "Imperialism is the waiting room to the social revolution of the
proletariat"; or the pamphlets "The proletarian revolution and Khrushchev's
revisionism" and "On the dictatorship of the Proletariat"; or "In
commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution" and "The Party,
the People's War and the Boycott."
Among the guerrilla actions shaking up Lima, during the First Campaign of Developing,
in the last third of 1989, we conducted armed propaganda and agitation, the successive
campaigns developed with the masses, with the proletariat, the leading class of the
revolution and the poor masses of the neighborhoods and shantytowns, the base of party
work in the capital; an intensive campaign of flyer distribution in support of the class
struggle, always aiming at the deepest sectors of the people, who will transform the old
society. This form of struggle consists from the simple painting of slogans in people's
boards, up to the conspicuous murals painted at San Marcos University, which proclaim the
rebellion of the youth; from the vibrant leaflets in the hands, to the huge posters
stamping the words "People's War" on the walls, showcases, buses, trains; from
the red flag commanded by the hammer and the sickle, which announces the new proletarian
dawn, to the thundering unleashed by the explosive charge; from the steeled spirit of the
class which animates the marches, up to the vigorous overflow of the armed mobilizations
which explodes in blockades and flaming tires of Molotovs and noise bombs. In synthesis,
from the idea that arms the mind to the shining hands in guerrilla actions.
The sabotages too express themselves, like the one at Renasa, action in support of the
struggling mining proletarians during the month of September. In October, car bombs at the
embassies of the USSR and China and at the United States Consulate. The actions against
the two imperialists superpowers are part of our answer to the new global
counterrevolutionary offensive, which is headed by Gorbachev, Deng and their gangs of
traitors. The burning of buses, about ten of them were burned, as well as others before
and after October, is another form of sabotage that has had a great impact, which hit
mainly State enterprises, since the State uses those enterprises politically, trying to
break up the people's struggles.
The electrical blackouts are another type of sabotage that has importance and
repercussions each time. In September, October, November and December there have been
blackouts of major dimensions, spanning not just from Marcona, in ICA, up to Chiclayo, in
Lambayeque, going through the Department of Lima and mainly in the capital, but also
hitting all of the Coastal and central Sierra; but besides their duration with all their
sequels they often lasts more than ten days. In observing how the state handles blackouts
and their derived problems, we see clearly whose interests it protects and whom it
benefits, that is, to whom they serve first and better.
Selective annihilation hits hard the snitches, recalcitrant enemies of the class and
the people, and other individuals with debts of blood; let's mention only two: first the
Commander of the National Police and sub chief of Interpol, who in Ayacucho bathed in the
blood of the people, murdering the children of the masses. Second, this is recent, the
former president of the Social Security (IPSS), F.S. Salaverry, who was a sharp knife in
the heart of every insured in Peru, a hated trafficker of public health and daily murderer
of all the retirees in the country; his annihilation hit particularly hard the bureaucracy
(one of the fundamental pillars of the State, the principal one after the armed forces.)
The hypocritical wailing of some is not truly for the justly annihilated, but a venting of
anxiety by the guilty conscience of the big oppressor bureaucrats, over whose heads pend
the implacable word of people's justice, which may take a while to be accomplished but it
is sure to come.
The guerrilla combats materialized in the attack of the main police station at the San
Ildefonso Market on October 2; annihilated were a lieutenant and five subordinates,
according to bourgeois newspapers. On December 15, 1989, an ambush of a Peruvian army bus
transporting 35 or 40 effective of the army intelligence service (SIE), trapped at the
crossing of Zarumilla Avenue and Jiron Pedregal, in the San Martin de Porres district.
Four were annihilated and 15 wounded, some seriously, according to reaction's own
newspapers.
The armed strike of November 3rd deserves special mention. This strike in the capital
acquired great importance since it targeted directly the municipal elections, and for this
reason it merited the concentrated fury of the reactionaries, revisionists and all of
their lackeys in general. They mobilized heaven and earth trying to break it up; but when
they saw it was uncontainable, they appealed to their usual great argument, unrestrained
violence, and there we had the real cause of the brutal and widespread repression at
Victoria Square. There, the National Police once more unleashed its bloodthirsty fury, and
brutally assaulted the multitude of friends and relatives of those victims of repression
who marched in the hundreds, carrying wreaths, flowers and banners, led by the Committee
of Families of Prisoners of War and Disappeared, to the cemetery, in order to render
tribute to the Heroes of the People fallen in the Rebellion in the Luminous Trenches of
Combat, and to the rest of the fighters and children of the people who have given their
lives for the revolution and shed their blood for the People's War. But the defying
courage of the people, the militant defense of the fighters and the support of the masses,
shone to confront the reactionary ignominy. For that reason, it deserves our firmest
rejection, the treacherous "condemnation" against the brutally attacked
marchers, not only by our recalcitrant enemies, but also by those who call themselves
"revolutionary," who in collusion with reaction "condemned" the
victims of repression, and in essence, as usual they supported the government and
reaction. However, repression proved useless to contain the preparations of the strike,
which directly threatened the electoral hacks; the self-proclaimed "Left Unity"
(IU) jumped to the forefront. Henry Pease, IU candidate to mayor of Lima, jumped to defend
what he called "democracy" and against the purported "terrorism"; and
he convoked a de facto anticommunist crusade of fascist odor, under the banner of a
"civic march," invoking unity of all "democrats" at a meeting held on
November 3rd, the same day as the strike. Their meeting was conducted under the umbrella
and protection of genocidal army and police guns, and under the "spiritual"
mantle of the Catholic Church; present were the candidates, the bosses of the reactionary
parties, among them (of course) the revisionist chiefs, including the
"caudillos" of the workers unions bureaucracy; first and foremost was Vargas
Llosa, for now the narrow winner of the first round in the elections, with whom H. Pease
united in an embrace of black collusion and contention. What did IU and its candidate
Pease get out of this meritorious service? The defeat of Pease and IU in the municipal
elections of 90 and a major disaster in the April [presidential elections], was a just and
well- deserved repudiation by the people. But neither the anticommunist march was able to
contain the armed strike on November 3, which was a resounding victory for the proletariat
and the people, one further step toward the major incorporation of the masses to the
People's War. "It doesn't matter what the traitors say!"
It is not possible to speak of the People's War, of the un declinable toil it entails,
without having very much in mind the men and women, militant fighters and children of the
masses, who every hour of the day, twenty-four fours each day, fight an uphill battle in
the dungeons of reaction; those who throughout the country built the Luminous Trenches of
Combat out of those dungeons; those who on June 19, 1986, by shedding their own blood gave
us the "Day of Heroism," a historic milestone of the rebellion, those who never
bent their knees, rose Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought to the heights and do it
and will continue to fight for the victory of the People's War, no matter what kind of
trench it happens to be in.
This is the direction of ten years of People's War and, in synthesis, the great
development achieved on its tenth anniversary. Its uncontainable and ever growing
expansion materialized in the multiplication of the Open People's Committees, achieved
precisely in 1989, a historic victory and transcendental step towards conquering Power
countrywide. Then, what does he purported "swamping" of the People's War claimed
by reactionaries consist of? It consists simply of a black vomit spewed by the
reactionaries and their hacks. Over this supposed "swamping" they carry out a
taunted and widely publicized campaign of "strategic failure of Sendero," which
they try to keep up, besides, with their supposed "abandoning of the revolutionary
road" and "non achievement of goals." What is their base for this supposed
"abandoning of the road?" No other than the advancement of the People's War in
the cities! An old publicity trick by the reactionary press, tried in much the same way
during the elections of 1985, which is not simply a coincidence. However, what is real and
practical are the continuous and victorious actions materialized to date, and how the war
flows on the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside and which is applied
firmly and consequently.
Moreover, according to our specific conditions, we apply this road following the norm
of developing simultaneously the People's War in countryside and city, the countryside
being the principal and the city a complement. Dialectically, the progress in the cities
is an evidence of the development of the road from countryside to city, and the
perspective to transfer the vertex of the People's War from the countryside to the city to
conquer Power in all the country. All of which is in strict conformity with the process of
surrounding the cities from the countryside; and consequently the People's War in Peru, is
the application of the theory of the People's War of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, as part of
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, applied to the specific conditions of the Peruvian Revolution.
On the other hand, what is the basis for their empty chatter of
"non-achievement of goals?" On this, they viciously traffic with revolutionary
secrets, since we can publicize general policies and even concrete policies in certain
fields, but not addressing specific details, which obviously only serve the enemy. Thus,
competing among themselves on who serve best their masters (reaction and imperialism,
mainly Yankee), they cry out loud: "they haven't met their goals," "the
People's Guerrilla Army doesn't exist," "there is no New Power," "they
didn't achieve the strategic equilibrium." If the People's Army didn't exist, then
what armed organization has carried out more than 120,000 guerrilla actions (1980-1989)?
What armed organization is developing the People's War in almost the entire country? What
armed organization have the reactionary armed and police forces been fighting for ten
years? Our military practice is made of solid and stunning realities and only an armed
force like the People's Guerrilla Army can fulfill it and maintain it. The thing is that
People's Army is an army of the new type, therefore its construction, fighting methods and
development follow other principles; Chairman Mao taught us: "You fight in your
way and we in ours; we fight when we can win and retreat when we cannot"; great
principle explained in 1965 as follows: "In other words, you rely on modern
weapons and we rely in the masses of people with a high revolutionary conscience; you play
with your superiority and we with ours; you have your combat methods and we have
ours."
ABOUT THE NEW POWER.
Since 1982 we have been destroying the Old Power in the countryside; generating in
consequence a Power vacuum, each day greater and extending to larger areas; as is well
known and recognized. Does that Power vacuum remain a political limbo, an interregnum of
the class struggle? Can anyone believe that the Old Power is destroyed and nothing can
replace it? Doesn't the destruction of the Old Power imply, as counterweight, the
construction of the New Power? Aren't destruction of the Old Power and construction of the
New Power two terms of the same contradiction? Well then, over the destruction of the Old
Power the New is created, which is a joint dictatorship, based on the worker-peasant
alliance and supported by the People's Army. As the ABC of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism reads,
the New Power in its development obviously follows the fluidity of the People's War, and
the specifications of our concrete reality. But precisely with the multiplication of the
Open People's Committees, in 1989, the New State tends to achieve a relative stability.
About strategic equilibrium, we can't just pull it out of a thin air, nor like a
gambler pulls an ace off his sleeves. These problems must be studied seriously, and
especially the military ones. The point is clear and concise: the defensive, the
equilibrium and the strategic offensive, as we well know, are the three elements of the
protracted war. The first being longest and, how international experience shows it, the
development of the second and third are intimately linked to the complex situation of the
overall class struggle in the country, and to the world situation, since they entail
sweeping away in the entire country, the rule of reaction and of imperialism and the
installation in the entire nation of a People's Republic, with all the repercussions it
has in the world, starting from the neighboring countries.
The above is a brief description about the direction and perspective of the People's
War in Peru, which continues firmly and on the rise, with unbending tenacity. Have we set
any specific date to go over to strategic equilibrium? Did any military plan have that
specific objective? Is it an unfulfilled "commitment?" Is it a task linked to
the reactionary elections? or is it a "goal" of Capping off the Great Leap with
a Golden Seal! or any other campaign, as they say? Pure speculations aimed at slandering
the People's War, trying to discredit it before the masses, and sow confusion. As the
Central Committee session stated, this engender is being propagated precisely at the time
that Peruvian reaction and imperialism have "a need to develop the counterinsurgency
war, empower their military actions, mobilize the masses and increase intervention, mainly
Yankee," and when, under the disguise of fighting against "drug
trafficking," Yankee imperialism plans its greater direct aggression against the
People's War. Situations which, linked to the transcendental progress of the People's War
in 89 enabled the advance from guerrilla warfare to war of movements, and clearly showed
that strategic equilibrium was in the cards and that the revolution developed in decisive
moments. That too, of course, was within our concrete material conditions.
In conclusion, the purported "strategic failure of Sendero," supposedly based
on the so-called "swamping" sustained by the nonsense that there is "an
abandonment of the road" and "non attainment of goals," is simply a new
sinister reactionary campaign led by Yankee imperialism itself. It is part of the
psychological warfare and the ongoing plan to empower the counterinsurgency war. But
besides all that, in the short term, it seeks to sow confusion amidst the Peruvian people
and to undermine the linking between the masses and the People's War.
In order to expose and mark with fire those vile mercenaries who miserably and
treacherously help reaction and imperialism, it is worth highlighting two questions:
First, they do not pay attention to the material conditions of the Peruvian Revolution;
this is something they obviously cannot see now or in the future, but we take it fully
into account, which at the same time refutes the lie that we practice dogmatism. Second,
that behind their demagoguery, lies the old rotten revisionist criteria about
revolutionary situations, which take them to imagine today (even if they do not say so
explicitly), the existence of a revolutionary crisis that, according to them, not to seize
Power now would imply the failure of the revolution in general and of the People's War in
particular. Let's remember the three requirements for the existence of a revolutionary
situation:
- 1. Power escapes the hands of reaction,
- 2. revisionism and opportunism do not exert an influence over the masses,
- 3. the masses close ranks around the Party.
Specifically in our case, the revolutionary crisis is linked to the People's War, it
suffices to say:
- 1. the armed forces retain it capacity to sustain the old State;
- 2. revisionism and opportunism continue to ride over the masses through the industrial
and trade union bureaucracy and;
- 3. the People's War must still generate the great jump about incorporating the masses,
which happens at the end of it.
Therefore, what we have is a revolutionary situation in increasing development due to
the sharpening of the class struggle and, mainly, the People's War, which not only has
persisted for ten years, but each day goes on, it is demolishing the Old State and
constructing the New Power a little more, aiming at completely sweeping aside the obsolete
and putrid Peruvian society of oppression and exploitation. Consequently, the perspective
of the current revolutionary situation in development is the revolutionary crisis or the
rise (auge) of the revolution, in the words of P. Mao Tse-tung.
Closely linked to the lie about the "strategic failure of Sendero" is the lie
about "division and surrender." The "surrender" farce is not new.
Since the beginning of his genocidal demagogic government, Garcia Perez and the armed
forces staged it; in the [document] "Develop the People's War to Serve the World
Revolution," we read:
"The October 1986 Lurigancho genocide followed, after the reactionary APRA
government staged the farce of the `massive capitulation of Senderistas' at Llochegua and
Corazon-Pampa, province of La Mar, Department of Ayacucho; even, as reported by all the
media, an interview was staged between the `supreme chief' (Garcia Perez) with
`surrendered leaders' who he received at the Palace, 'an act filmed from a distance' in
which nobody heard anything or saw anyone's face due ostensibly to `understandable
security reasons.' But the engender was quickly disemboweled by the published statements
of a navy officer who took part in the operative in question: `the same officer explained
in the interview by this reporter that the hundred or so people who allegedly surrendered,
among men, women and children, never got near the bases of Corazon-Pampa or Llochegua, but
were rounded up by marine infantry at the mountain heights and later on taken to both
localities. When lieutenant Anibal was asked if the peasants, at the time of the
surrendering, carried any weapons, he answered no . . . '; according to La Republica of
October 25, 1985. That was the famous lie about the 'surrendering.'"
Again today, they resurrect the same treacherous lie trying to undermine the People's
War and cover up the forceful nucleation they inflict upon the peasantry, to create
mesnadas (paramilitary peasants), repeating obsolete molds previously smashed by the
convergence of the enslaved masses themselves and by guerrilla actions. It is evident that
with the increasing surrender of mesnadas created by the armed forces, which we saw more
frequently these past few months, their aim is to reenact the genocidal blood bath of the
years 83 and 84.
THE REACTIONARY DREAM "SPLIT IN SENDERO".
This purulent tale repeated over and over by reaction is "based" on the
purported "surrender," "swamping" and "strategic failure"
discussed previously, and on forgered flyers distributed by the armed forces (as part of
their psychological warfare) as well as on a supposedly, "being tired of so much
fighting," "being sorry for so many deaths," "hard life and difficult
conditions," etc., all falsehoods that clearly revealed which institutions,
organizations and feathery pens were the sources of such engenders. All of them are
defenders or sustainers or "retainers" of the old State and the obsolete
Peruvian society: deadly enemies of the People's War who cover up the crimes of the
Peruvian State and its armed and police forces of the daily genocides they perpetrate
against the people. These hacks deny the basic principles of war; the quota needed to
annihilate the enemy, the aspects of construction that the war requires. They are sunk in
the historical pessimism of reaction and imperialism, whom they serve, incapable of
understanding that the People's War is animated and developed by the optimism of class
provided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought and that each fighter of the People's
Army is forged by the principle of, "Serving the people with all her/his heart."
The nonsense they preach, naturally, is well suited to the counterinsurgency plans and
aimed against the People's War and the Party, seeking to fetter the brilliant
revolutionary perspective.
In addition, those who have internal problems derived from their own mistakes and
opportunism, infatuated especially by their persistent electioneering, joyfully cry out
the supposed existence of the two positions in the Party: "a militarist one and a
political one." Such differentiation is theoretically erroneous; assuming, as they
speculate, the existence of a military position as such, would be a right opportunist
line, whose component, with regard to the military line, would be bourgeois line opposed
to the Party. On what do they base such Philistine speculation? On the disemboweled
"defeat and swamping of 1989" and the "strategic failure!" All this
only shows their desperation and impotence before the advance of a People's War which
threatens their nefarious riding on the masses and shakes their blessed chapels of
parliamentary cretinism.
However, all that chatter is only dead leaves before the strong unity of the Party,
solidly sustained on the Basis of Party Unity (BUP), sanctioned at the First Congress, and
an irreplaceable warranty of the steady development of the People's War.
In synthesis, what are the bottom causes of the insane fabrication about "split
and surrender?" The general electio